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CHAPTER 9
Healthcare – Unleashing the Power
of Public-Private Partnership
Abstract This chapter describes how the government partnered with
private enterprises to renew the country’s healthcare system. Before the
reforms, health insurance was a foreign concept for the vast majority of
Georgians. In 2006, less than 1 percent of the population was insured. At
the same time, most healthcare facilities were in a state of ill repair, and the
medical staff was insufﬁciently trained. In response, the government
divided the country into healthcare clusters and requested bids from
insurance companies to provide basic coverage for the neediest in a
given cluster. The winning bidder was obligated to renovate or rebuild
and operate the hospitals in that area. By 2012, more than half the
population was insured and more than 150 new or renovated hospitals
were opened. What is more, competition between providers also resulted
in higher incentives for medical personnel to perform well and grow
professionally.
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Until recently, health insurance was an unfamiliar concept for the vast
majority of Georgians. In 2006, less than 1 percent of the population
was insured. Most healthcare facilities were in a state of ill repair, and
the medical staff was insufﬁciently trained. In response, the government
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divided the country into healthcare clusters and invited bids from
insurance companies to provide basic coverage for the neediest in a
given cluster. The winning bidder was mandated to renovate or rebuild
and operate the hospitals in that area. The scheme, set up as one of
Georgia’s biggest public-private partnerships to date, was a big success.
By 2012, more than half of the population was insured. What is more,
competition between providers also resulted in better service for
patients and in higher incentives for medical personnel to perform
well and grow professionally.
9.1 THE SOLIDARITY CHALLENGE
Worldwide, governments have come up with various approaches to
tackle healthcare. Even developed countries are struggling to ﬁnd the
right setup. The latest, and perhaps most prominent, experiment to
bring affordable healthcare to the masses is “Obamacare” in the
United States. It is widely criticized, and the jury is still out on its
long-term impact. The underlying challenge is one of solidarity. The
young and healthy are reluctant to spend much on insurance; they regard
it as a waste of money. But any insurance system solely dependent on
contributions from the elderly and inﬁrm alone will have a funding
problem. And few governments, except perhaps for those in countries
with valuable natural resources, can afford to ﬁnance healthcare without
some form of continuous contribution from the population. What is
more, completely free healthcare is an incentive for patients to collude
with providers and request treatment beyond what is necessary. If health-
care is fully paid for, corrupt individuals will always ﬁnd a way to take
advantage of the system by charging the government extra costs. When
they are confronted, they will manipulate public opinion by saying that
the government is cutting corners at the expense of the well-being of the
population.
In Georgia, the problems in 2009 went beyond this fundamental
ﬁnancing challenge. Most healthcare facilities had been built in the
1960s and 1970s and were not properly maintained because of insufﬁcient
funds. Much medical equipment was outdated, hospitals were overstaffed,
but most medical personnel were not sufﬁciently trained. While the
approach the government came up with may not have solved all of these
structural problems at once, it was still a big step in the right direction for
the healthcare system in Georgia.
150 PRACTICAL ECONOMICS
9.2 THE SPECIAL INSURANCE PROGRAM
In 2010, the Georgian government started its “special insurance program”
(SIP). In parallel, state-owned healthcare facilities were privatized. All
facilities were categorized based on a single question: were they commer-
cially viable? If they were, they were to be privatized right away. If they
weren’t, they were either kept under state ownership (e.g., essential clinics
to treat infective diseases) or made part of the second stage of the SIP,
although that second stage was never fully implemented.
The SIP was a joint effort by the state and all private insurance compa-
nies; Georgia did not have any public or state-owned insurance companies.
Its primary target group was that part of the population that had been
identiﬁed by the welfare program as most in need (see previous chapter). At
the ﬁrst stage of the SIP, the government deﬁned the minimum insurance
package and gave insurance vouchers covering that minimum package to
the neediest families. Families were free to redeem their voucher for mini-
mum coverage with any of the private insurance companies. All monthly
payments were picked up by the government. The fact that the group of
those insured under this scheme did not only include the elderly or the sick
but everyone in the lowest wealth bracket made the voucher relatively
cheap; initial calculations regarding the package and the price of the
voucher were carried out by the Ministry of Healthcare in consultations
with actuaries and private insurance companies.
9.3 INITIAL SETBACKS
Unfortunately, the government’s expectation that the scheme would create
competition among insurance companies and increase the quality of service,
or encourage companies to offer additional services beyond the minimum
package, did not come true. The miscalculation the government made was
to assume that the poorest had sufﬁcient knowledge of what insurance was
and that they would not trade the voucher for cash. While vouchers were
numbered and named to prevent beneﬁciaries from selling their vouchers to
others, there was no mechanism in place to stop insurance companies from
offering cash instead of better service in exchange for the vouchers. As a
result, many of the neediest effectively sold their vouchers to insurance
companies rather than redeem them for improved service or extended
coverage. Companies even employed so-called “marketing” agents that
would go door to door and offer cash in exchange for the voucher.
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Competing companies adopted different “marketing” approaches. Some of
them hired local doctors as their representatives, while others hired school-
teachers, who were opinion leaders in many rural areas at the time. Some
even went as far as enlisting the services of representatives of local govern-
ments to attract as many voucher holders as possible. For an insurance
company, the voucher was a guarantee of steady income from the govern-
ment. This made it well worth the comparatively small expense of a cashback
to voucher holders, most of whom had no idea how the system worked.
At the time, the whole concept of insurance was completely new for
Georgia. Most Georgians only had a vague idea how they would beneﬁt
from being insured. The government ran an extensive communications
campaign to educate the population about these beneﬁts, but the cam-
paign failed to reach most of its target audience. The insurance companies
took advantage of the ignorance of many voucher holders and made the
cash kickback the norm. The poor preferred to give their vouchers to those
companies that offered cash in exchange, rather than to those who offered
better service or coverage. The government’s plan to deﬁne the basic
insurance package and then have private insurance companies compete
with each other by offering additional services to voucher holders failed.
9.4 HEALTHCARE CLUSTERS
To put an end to the semi-corrupt practices, the government devised a
large-scale public-private partnership program, pursuing a dual objective:
provide healthcare services to the poor and build new, state-of-the-art
healthcare facilities, or upgrade existing facilities. As a ﬁrst step, the
whole country was divided into relatively small healthcare clusters. For
each cluster, the government determined the number of necessary hospital
beds as well as the number of voucher recipients. As a next step, the
government announced a tender among private insurance companies for
every cluster to insure all voucher holders in that cluster. The winning
company would be required to build new hospitals (or renovate existing
hospitals which were transfered from state to the insurance company for
free) as deemed necessary for that cluster within 18–24 months, equipped
with state-of-the-art technology as speciﬁed by the Ministry of Healthcare,
and adjust the number and qualiﬁcation of medical employees.
An auctionwas held in each cluster, and the contract went to the company
that offered the lowest cost per insured person. In most clusters, the govern-
ment signed over the existing hospital to the winning company − complete
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with land, buildings, equipment, and staff − for free. The company would
then have to refurbish or re-build, re-equip, and re-staff the hospital. In the
vastmajority of cases, the existing infrastructurewas in such a poor repair that
only the land could be used.
Except for insufﬁciently qualiﬁed employees who lost their jobs, every-
body won:
• The state. The government successfully privatized healthcare facilities
that had been mismanaged before: hospitals that were overstaffed,
did not provide adequate service, yet kept asking for additional funds
from the government. The most difﬁcult decision – to reduce inefﬁ-
ciency and let go part of the medical personnel – was shifted to
private sector players, who took care of it efﬁciently and effectively.
• Private insurance companies. Insurers received additional funds for
the insured and were given an opportunity to enter a new market,
effectively becoming healthcare providers. The transformation was
co-ﬁnanced through the PPP program. All the insurance companies
had to do was to calculate the costs of the facilities they would be
required to build, add these costs to the cost of providing insurance
services to the insured in the speciﬁc cluster, and come up with the
price per insured individual.1
• Medical staff. While the total number of hospital employees shrunk,
those who stayed were given higher salaries (based on their perfor-
mance), a better work environment, better training, and better
equipment to work with.
• Patients. The population was given much better service in newly
built or fully refurbished hospitals. One hundred ﬁfty new hospitals
were put into operation over the course of 18 months, some of them
newly built, others newly renovated.
As a whole, the resulting contracts constituted one of the biggest public-
private partnerships between the government and private sector in
Georgia.
In Tbilisi, the capital, the situation was slightly different. The privatiza-
tion tender was held among insurance companies only to insure the poor,
not to build any new hospitals, as a different hospital development plan
was put together for the capital city. Tbilisi itself was also broken down
into clusters, and every hospital was privatized based on open tenders or
bought out by the existing staff. Where there was a lack of interest from
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the private sector, the government adopted a different approach. The
Ministry of Healthcare itself refurbished some buildings and gave them
to state-owned hospitals under the condition that the staff would buy out
these hospitals at a minimum price per square meter, payable in install-
ments, and bring in new equipment. Despite initial disputes, a few dozen
hospitals were privatized in this fashion and moved to newly renovated
buildings.
9.5 HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
Of course, the cluster-based partnership with private companies did not
solve every problem overnight. Training was the biggest challenge. The
level of training medical personnel had previously received was very low.
The new setup provided a better environment for them to grow profes-
sionally. In the past, most of the hospitals had been owned by the state.
There was no competition among the hospitals and, hence, no need to
attract and develop the best doctors. The privatization of most of the
hospitals brought competition for patients, and this triggered a war for
talent too. Hospitals made investments to attract the best doctors and to
improve the qualiﬁcation of their medical personnel.
Many healthcare experts believe in the magic of regulation and pre-
reform Georgia was no exception. Regulation and licensing was widely
regarded as the key to highly qualiﬁed staff. While this might work in
some countries, it didn’t work in Georgia. Because of corrupt practices
and government inefﬁciencies, the regulatory approach was not effective.
Only the introduction of competition among different healthcare providers
brought a signiﬁcant improvement. When the state is the only (or main)
provider of healthcare and salaries of doctors are regulated, doctors have no
incentive to invest in their professional development. The income gap
between the best doctor and the worst one usually does not reﬂect the
relative levels of their qualiﬁcation and performance. Often, regulated sal-
aries are tied to tenure rather than performance. Good doctors are irked by
this injustice and often develop their own private practice, partly illegally,
alongside their duties as state employees in public hospitals. Less ambitious
doctors simply stop making an effort to grow professionally or provide
superior service to patients. This effect can, to some extent, be compensated
for with performance-based bonuses, but many countries have not intro-
duced such schemes to the healthcare sector. But if the healthcare sector is
privatized and companies are under pressure to attract the best personnel,
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doctors have an incentive to perform well, to grow professionally, and to
make names for themselves in their respective areas of specialization. This is
exactly what happened in Georgia since the reforms outline previously.
Privatization also helped to take care of a problem that was quite speciﬁc
to Georgia. Georgians are naturally proud. Everybody wants to be a doctor,
and nobody wants to be a nurse. And as the healthcare sector was just as
corrupt as any other sector in pre-reform Georgia, most of the medical staff
could simply buy a doctor’s license. As a result, Georgia had more doctors
than nurses before the privatization of the healthcare sector. But the man-
agers of the private companies that participated in the cluster-based auctions
knew very well that they would have no use for vast numbers of insufﬁ-
ciently trained, questionably licensed doctors. Some of them were let go,
and some of them volunteered to retrain with special programs.
9.6 RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Eventually, a new problem arose from a structural conﬂict of interest. In
most clusters, hospital operations and insurance were in the hands of the
same company. Without proper precautions, this could easily have resulted
in poor service. Especially in rural areas, insurance companies were tempted
to cash in on their privilege as the only provider of healthcare services and
maximize proﬁts by providing inadequate service. The government used a
combination of three measures to prevent this from happening:
• Granularity. The clusters were deﬁned in a way that made it easy for
private patients to go to a competitor’s hospital in the neighboring
cluster. Since most companies were trying to serve not only state-
insured patients but private patients as well, this acted as a powerful
incentive to provide good service.
• Protocols. Additionally, the government put in place protocols that
specify the minimum service level and a price for that level of service.
These protocols were based on international best practices and local
price levels. Beneﬁciaries who choose to obtain medical services from
a private provider pay the difference between the price speciﬁed by
the protocol and the private bill.
• Supervision. Finally, the medical regulator was strengthened to help
resolve three types of potential conﬂict: customers dealing with
insurance companies, hospitals dealing with insurance companies,
and hospitals dealing with customers.
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Speciﬁcally, the regulator protects beneﬁciaries from local monopolies,
i.e., areas in which the hospital owned by the insurance company is the
only medical facility. If there are numerous complaints from beneﬁciaries
in a given cluster, the regulator will conduct an investigation and, if need
be, annul the license of any hospital or any doctor. The regulator also has
the authority to force an insurance company to allow beneﬁciaries to go to
another hospital if they are willing to pay the difference between the
protocol price and the price asked by the competing hospital. And the
regulator has a right to resolve disputes between an insurance company
and a hospital, typically regarding delayed payments from insurance com-
panies to hospitals.
Protocols and regulatory oversight also partially helped to take care
of one of the last remaining issues in Georgia’s healthcare sector at
the time: the cost of emergency surgery. Under the new scheme,
emergency surgery carries a higher price tag than planned procedures.
When this regulation took effect, the number of emergency heart
operations increased threefold, while the number of planned heart
operations decreased accordingly. Doctors were simply ﬁlling out the
forms in a way that would maximize their proﬁts. Protocols and strict
regulatory oversight was an attempt to prevent these practices.
However, practice showed that the only way for minimizing the
abuse of state ﬁnancing in the healthcare is 80/20 co-ﬁnancing struc-
ture of the insurance scheme. The co-ﬁnancing must be done at the
moment of receiving healthcare services, not necessarily during
obtaining insurance packages. For the poorest, additional ﬁnancing
scheme must be put in place that subsidizes most of the 20 percent
co-ﬁnancing obligation. Only with co-ﬁnancing scheme the patient
has all the right incentives not to follow proposed schemes of the
hospitals and carefully study the costs rather than feel free to let the
doctors work their documents to earn more money on the back of
state ﬁnances.
9.7 THE END STATE
In 2012, the status of the Georgian healthcare system was as follows. With
the exception of the capital, the vast majority of hospitals was privatized and
managed by one of the ﬁve major insurance companies that had participated
in the cluster-based auctions. A handful of healthcare facilities had been
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singled out as not commercially viable but medically indispensable.
Examples include an HIV clinic, a treatment center for infective diseases,
and a tuberculosis clinic. The government decided to keep these facilities
under state ownership and provide them with additional funds to update
their infrastructure and improve the service.
By 2012, the ﬁve insurance companies had already built or fully
renovated more than 100 hospitals. The size of these hospitals varied,
depending on the healthcare requirements in a given cluster. Most
hospitals were small (10–25 beds), but there were also a few larger
ones with more than 50 beds. In some regions, other private providers
emerged and started competing with the hospitals operated by the ﬁve
insurance companies. In some cases, these new competitors were the
successors of decommissioned former state-owned hospitals that had
been bought out by their staff, an approach similar to the process that
had been adopted in Tbilisi. By the end of 2012, there were more than
20 companies that owned hospitals across Georgia. Some of them big,
some of them small, some of them offering universal healthcare, others
specialized in one way or another. By 2012, most of the unnecessary staff
in the healthcare sector had already been laid off. Competition among
hospitals for the best doctors was ﬁerce, and doctors were highly moti-
vated to grow professionally. Many of them participated in specially
devised training programs.
In 2006, less than 1 percent of Georgian population had health
insurance. By the end of 2012, more than half of the population was
insured. About 25 percent of the insured were privately participating in
the SIP, while the rest was covered by the government’s basic insurance
policy. The insurance policy covered all medical expenses for the poor,
80 percent of the cost of medical treatment for everybody else and 50
percent of the cost of drugs (up to USD 100 USD per year). The 80-
percent coverage turned out to yield the best tradeoff between service
quality and efﬁciency. It discourages beneﬁciaries from receiving unne-
cessary services and helps minimize collusion between doctors and
patients to cheat the insurer.
Most recently, the Georgia Healthcare Group (GHG) went public on
the London Stock Exchange. At the time of the IPO in November 2015,
the company had been in the healthcare business for less than a decade.
But thanks to good management and favorable conditions in Georgia’s
healthcare market, the IPO was a big success.
9 HEALTHCARE –UNLEASHING THE POWEROF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 157
9.8 LATER DEVELOPMENTS
The original plan was to liberalize the healthcare sector completely at the
next stage. Once insurance companies had recovered their investments in
newly built hospitals, the cluster system should have been dismantled,
allowing all voucher holders to choose any insurance company, depending
on who offers the best service. Thanks to a much more knowledgeable
population, it might have worked the second time round. The govern-
ment elected in 2012, however, chose a different path and decided to
insure every citizen of Georgia, regardless of wealth and age – a bold and a
popular move, but it remains to be seen whether the effects of this move
will ﬁnancially sustainable in a long term.2
In any case, the reforms undertaken between 2010 and 2012 are widely
recognized as a major breakthrough moment for the Georgian healthcare
sector, especially for the population, who now receives better and more
reliable treatment than ever before in the country’s history.
NOTES
1. Actually, due to their lack of experience, some of the private companies
miscalculated the revenue streams and had to be merged with others to
absorb the impact. Some even went bankrupt.
2. http://www.georgiapolicy.org/2016/03/georgia-is-moving-forward-on-
welfare-reform/ (retrieved in May 2016).
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